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The defendant by the Information in this action was
charged with the murder of Ray Ashdown, on the 5th day
of July, 1955, at Cedar City, Iron County, Utah.
The action was tried in Iron County, Utah, on August
22 to 26th, 1955, when the Jury returned a verdict of guilty
of murder in the first degree with a recommendation of life
imprisonment, from which the defendant appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Appellant was the wife of Ray Ashdown.
They lived at Cedar City, Utah; On the morning of July 5,
1955, Dr. R. G. Williams was called to the Ashdown residence
by Mrs. Ashdown to attend her husband Ray. When the
Doctor arrived Mr. Ashdown was having a generalized convulsive seizure and death seemed to be imminent. He told
the Doctor he had drank some lemon juice about a half hour
before, then he took another convulsion and died. (T. 21-5).
Analysis of the contents of the stomach of Mr. Ashdown by
the State Chemist revealed that the same contained strychnine and the cause of his death was attributed to strychnine
poisoning. There was a bottle of lemon juice found in the
refrigerator of the Ashdown home but it did not contain any
strychnine (T. 45-7) and no where in the home was any
strychnine found. (T.57).
On the 9th of July, 1955, a funeral was held for Ray
Ashdown, and at the cemetery after the burial the Sheriff
of Iron County, Arthur Nelson, asked Mrs. Ashdown's sonin-law to bring Mrs. Ashdown to the City and County Building for a talk. The defendant and her sister came to the
Sheriff's Office. There were present Sheriff Nelson and
Deputies Arch Benson and Chuck Wells. The ladies complained about the heat and were served a glass of lemonade.
The Sheriff then asked if they could talk to defendant alone
2
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in the Courtroom. They went into the Court Room where
in addition to the Sheriff and his, Deputies, the District Attorney, Patrick H. Fenton was present. (T. 91-2). Then the
defendant was subjetced to a series of questioning which began at about 4 in the afternoon and did not end until about 9
or 9 :30 in the evening, during all of which time defendan~
never left the room, was not given any food or rest, and at
about 8 :30 in the evening defendant made certain statements
to the effect that she put the poison in the cup of lemon
juice and gave it to her husband to drink, after which she
was held on a charge of murder in the first degree. (T.71-9).
The record discloses that the defendant was a person of
limited education, having gone to school only to the seventh
or eighth grade-that she was married between the age of
16 and 17 years (T-113)- that she had just attended the
funeral and burial of her husband when she was taken to
the Court House for questioning-that the weather was extremely hot (T.71-2)-that she was in a hysterical frame
of mind and sobbed and cried during the questioning (T. 107,
116, 135) -that .she was taken in for questioning alone and
was not represented by family, friends or legal counselthat her father was in the Court House during the questioning and requested that she be given an attorney, but her
father as well as her uncle were denied admission to the
Court Room where she was being questioned, and were told
that there was an attorney in there to represent her. (T. 78,
86-7, 97, 105-6). The defendant, after the alleged admission,
requested legal counsel which request was entirely ignored.
(T. 136). Next day a written confession was prepared by the
Sheriff and handed to her for signing which she did. (T.834). At the trial of the action counsel for defendant objected
to the admission of the written testimony and of the testimony and evidence relating to the oral confessions for the
3
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reasons they were obtained in violation of the Constitutional
rights of the defendant, (T. 118-19) and the Court ruled the
written confession should not be admitted but made findings to the effect that there was no coercion, duress. or promises of immunity or violation of constitutional rights of defendant (T. 150-53). The case went to the Jury and the
Jury after deliberating some 19 hours returned a verdict of
guilty with recommendation of life imprisonment (T. 190).
It is from the findings of the Court and the verdict of the
Jury that this appeal is taken, on the grounds· and points
hereinafter stated :

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I. THE VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO LAW
AND THE EVIDENCE.
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THERE WAS NO COERCION, DURESS OR PROMISES
OF IMMUNITY OR VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT.
POINT III. THE COUR.T ERRED IN ADMITTING
TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY THE
STATE TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT UNDER
ORAL QUESTIONING PRIOR TO HER ARREST, ORALLY CONFESSED TO CRIME CHARGED, FOR THE REASON THAT SUCH TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE WERE
OBTAINED THROUGH COERCION, DURESS AND
PROMISES OF IMMUNITY AND IN VIOLATION OF
LAW AND OF THE GUARANTEES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE OF
UTAH.
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN CHARGING
THE JURY AS PER HIS INSTRUCTION NO. 6, BY
4
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WHICH THE JURY WAS CONFUSED AND MISDIRECTED SO AS TO RENDER AN IMPROPER VERDICT
AGAINST DEFENDANT.
POINT V. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL.
POINT VI. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR. NEW TRIAL.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND
THE EVIDENCE.
Aside from the oral admissions made by the defendant
during the questioning by the officers there was no other
evidence in the record connecting defendant with the crime.
There was no strychnine found in the home or no record of
defendant's purchasing any from any drug store, nor did
the officers find any at the farm of Kumen Jones, where the
defendant said she obtained it. There was no evidence of
any outside source whatsoever to connect defendant with
the crime.
As will be hereinafter strongly contended by the defense, that all of the testimony and evidence that defendant
confessed to the crime charged, is and was inadmissible, and
if such contention is upheld by this Court, then there is no
other evidence to support the charge and the verdict of the
Jury must be set aside.

POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THERE WAS NO COERCION, DURESS OR
PROMISES OF IMMUNITY OR VIOLATION
OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT.
5
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Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah, provides.:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah, provides:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel.
***The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself.***
The Court made findings with regard to the admissibility of the testimony given by Sheriff Arthur Nelson, his
Deputies and Patrick H. Fenton, the District Attorney to
the effect that there was no promise made or assurance
given of any immunity for prosecution (2) That defendant
was advised of her constitutional rights before she made the
statements sought to be introduced (3) That she did not ask
for an attorney until after such statements were made (4)
That she was questioned by the officers from approximately
4 :00 P.M. until approoximately 8 :30 P.M. before she made
the statements in question, and that her sister, her father
and her uncle were not permitted to go into the Courtroom
during the course of that questioning. (5) That there were
no threats of violence or other threats made by either of the
officers .or by the District Attorney ( 6) That there was no
promise made nor any assurance given of any benefit or
reward, except the District Attorney informed the defendant
that if poison had been given by mistake it might make a
difference between a prosecution £or murder and manslaughter, and informed the defendant of the penalties for those
respective offenses (7) That the method of examination and
circumstances were not severe enough to amount to compulsion as that is contemplated by the constitutional provisions
or statutes which provide that a person shall not be c·ompell6
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ed to give evidence against himself. (8) That the circumstances were not such as to induce the defendant to make
the statements in question and (9) that the inducing cause
of the statement was not fear nor duress, nor compulsion,
nor any promise or assurance of any reward or immunity.
(Transcript page 150).
The defense contends that the Court erred in such findings, and that the alleged confession was not free and voluntary and was obtained in violation of the guarantees of the
State Constitution and of the United States Constitution
which stands as a bar against the conviction of any individual in an American Court by means of a coerced confession,
or the denial of the right to counsel, or the denial of due
pr.ocess.
The record is replete with instances to show that defendant's alleged confession was not voluntary.
Appellant sets forth the circumstances surrounding
such examination of the defendant as follows:
1.

Defendant was a person of limited education.

2. She was in a hysterical frame of mind having attended the funeral and burial of her husband just immediately prior to the questioning.
3.

The weather was extremely hot.

4. No member of her family was permitted to be in
the room with her during such examination, although her
father and uncle requested it.
5. She was continuously questioned and kept in the
Court Room from 4 P.M. until 9 :30 P.lVI. and at 8:30 P.M.
such alleged confession was made by her.
7
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6. She did not have benefit of counsel during such examination, and was not properly advised of her constitutional rights.

7.
over.

Officers repeated questions and statements over and

Appellant sets forth excerpts: from the record to substantiate the above circumstances and to show that the alleged statements were not made freely and voluntarily by
her but were the product of sustained questioning and pressure, and that her constitutional rights against self incrimination, the right to counsel and due process were flagrantly
violated:
That defendant was a person of limited education:
William Hopkins, Direct, Transcript page 113 :
How much of an education did she have?
A Very little education.**She probably pass:ed
the seventh or eighth grade. ***She was between sixteen and seventeen years of age when
she was married. Just a child like."
Defendant was requested to come to Court Room for
questioning directly after the funeral of her husband:
Sheriff Arthur Nelson, Drect, Transcript page 71 :
"Q

"I asked to have her come up. I went out to the cemetery and the funeral was: just ·over and they were
ready to leave and I contacted her brother-in-law**
Stewart had Mrs. Ashdown in his car, he was a sonin-law of Mrs. Ashdown, and I asked him if he would
ask Stewart to bring Mrs. Ashdown by the County
and City Building, we would like to talk to her. So
Alf brought word back to me that he would go that
way and take Mrs. Ashdown to the County and City
Building.''
The weather was hot:
8
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Sheriff Arthur Nelson, Direct, Transcript page 72:
"Well they were complaining about it being hot and
it was hot so we served them a glass of lemonade,
and then I asked Mrs. Ashdown if we could talk to
her alone in the courtroom. And so we went into the
courtroom and talked with her."
No member of her family was permitted to be in the
Court Room with her during such examination, although her
father and uncle requested it:
Sheriff Arthur Nelson, Direct, Transcript page 73 :

Was Mr. Arch Benson, another deputy sheriff.
present during this conversation?
A No, he was out in the hallway sort of taking
care of the door ; there was people trying to
come in and out and we tried to keep everyone
out of the courtroom.
Charles Wells, by Court, Transcript page 138:
"Q Did he -say he would like to talk to her. alone?
A Yes, sir.
Q Her sister was with her at that time?
A Her sister was in the Sheriff's Office at the
time, yes, sir."
"Q

Walter Segler, Direct, Transcript page 104:
"A Well, when they entered the door at the foot of
the stairs this Mr. Benson was at the foot of
the steps and didn't figure on anybody entering
there.
Mr. Segler continuing from Transcript page 105:
Who was with you?
Well, Mr. Hopkins, her father.
And I says I am her uncle and this is her father.
And I says I don't think she has got a right to
be questioned without her father's presence or
some attorney.
Q What happened.
A And I said I would like to go to the sheriff's
office. He never resisted, but we walked up the
stairs and 'vhen we got to the top of the stairs
there was another, either marshal or, I wouldn't
be sure, but I believe it was Hoyt, I am not sure,

"Q

A

9
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a city marshal,- I think. Of course I am not
familiar with these names, I just since this
came up got acquainted with them."
Segler from Transcript page 106:
"I told them I thought that Mr. Hopkins, her father,
or some attorney should be in her presence. And they
refused to let either one of us go in."
William Hopkins, Direct, T. page 114:
"A

I remember, if my memory serves me rightly,
I appeared there between four and five o'clock
and went immediately into the sheriff's office;
and there we contacted Mr. Benson, Sheriff
Miller and Sheriff Bybee, and as I remember it
right, I made the remark that it didn't look to
me like a fair, square deal, to railroad that girl
into that sheriff's office without counsel or
friends of any description.
Q What was the answer to that?
A Well, if I remember right, I believe Mr. Benson
related that she was under suspicion. And if I
remember right I believe I told him that we was
very sorry, that we had no-that was the first
information I had to that effect that she was
even under suspicion, and he informed me that
she was under suspicion."

Defendant was questioned and k·ept in the Court Room
from 4 ,P.M. until 9:30 .P.M. without food or rest:
Nelson, Direct, T. page 71 :
"Q

A

Will you tell us the time of day that conversation took place?
As near as I can remember it was about four
o'clock."

Wells, Direct, T. page 129:
"The Court: Did she leave the room at any time
during the period from when she first went into
the courtroom until she left in the evening?
A. No sir.
The Court: Was she offered the opportunity to
leave the room at any time?
A I don't think that I remember of a request be-

10
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ing made or the offer being made at any time,
Judge.
The Court: What time was it that she actually did
leave the courtroom?
A That was possibly, I would say, between 9:30
and a quarter to ten.
The Court: Did you notice the time? When you
say 'possibly' that doesn't help u.s.
A I came out of the courtroom at 9 :30, yes, sir.
I noticed the time."
Wells, Cr.oss, T. page 135 :
Q Did you offer anything, any food, didn't you say
"Will you have lunch? Will you eat? Did you
say that?
A You mean after four o'clock?
Q Yes.
A No."
Nelson, Direct, T. page 74 :
"Q Was anything said to Mrs. Ashdown that she
was free to leave the courtroom if she cared to?
A By George, I don't remember about that."
Walter Segler, Direct, T. page 108:
"***But before that, when Mr. Wells come out he
says, 'Well' he says, 'it has been six and a half
hours in this."
Defendant was in an hysterical condition during the
questioning:
After defendant made the alleged oral confession in the
evening of the 9th day of July, she was placed under arrest
but she wasn't asked to sign any written statement until
the next day on the lOth. To show that defendant was hysterical and not in a calm or unexcited state and didn't know
what she was doing on July 9th when the alleged confession
was made, the following is quoted from the record:
Nelson, Direct, T. page 86:
"The Court: Sheriff, why did you wait until the
afternoon of the lOth before offering this to
1\Irs. Ashdo\vn to sign?
11
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A

Well, we didn't take any written statement on
the 9th. We thought we would talk to her on
the lOth, she would be calm and wouldn't be exeit·ed and she would know what she was doing.
We didn't want to feel like taking advantage of
ber."

Walter Segler, Direct, T. page 107 :
"A

And at that time I heard her crying and carrying on in there.
Q How long did you hear her crying?
A A couple of times when I was in the hall, and I
don't know how long.
Q And you were there in the hall how long would
you say, how many hours?
A Well, in the Sheriff's office and thereabout and
back and forth to Mrs. Ashdown's place, I would
say we was there approximately two and a half
hours, or such a matter."

William Hopkins, R.edirect, T. page 116:
"Q Could you hear Mildred crying?
A I could. Crying and moaning.
Q All the time you were there?
A Well, at intervals, most of the time, yes."
Wells, Cross Examination, T. page 135:
"Q Was she crying?
A She would sob and cry at times., yes sir."
Defendant did not have benefit of counsel during such
examination although she requesrted it and her father and
uncle requested it:
Nelson, Direct, T. page 78:
"***At that point she said 'I had ought to have an
attorney.' 'Well' I said 'you have told us about everything now except the strychnine.' I says, 'Tell us
where you got the strychnine and we can clear it up
and get this over with.'
Nelson, Direct, T. p. 86:
"A She said 'I had ought to have an attorney,' that
is the way she put it.

12
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The Court: And then what was said?
A Well, I told her, I said 'Well, you told us about
everything now except where you got the
strychnine.' I says 'It is a little late to get an
attorney.' "
The Court: What did she say then?
A She didn't ask any more for an attorney. She
never mentioned one any more."
Nelson, Cross, T. page 87:
"Q Now, you stated to the court that after she
asked for counsel she had confessed everything
but where she g.ot the strychnine, is that correct?
A Yes, that is right.
Q And you felt, like you told the court, there was
no need for doing that, just as well get it over
with.
A Yes, that is the way I felt about it.
Q You didn't heed to her request, then did you?
A No, we didn't."
Nelson, Cross, T. page 97:
"Q Now, how many times, sheriff, did that girl ask
for counsel, one, two or three times?
A I heard her ask the one time.
Q Why didn't you give it to her, sheriff.
A Well, she had told us about everything then."
Segler, Direct, T. page 105:
"A Well, I says, it isn't fair to take that girl up
there and question her without her father's
presence or an attorney.***
A And I .says, I am her uncle and this is her father. And I says, 'I don't think she has got a
right to be questi·oned without her father's presence or some attorney."
Segler, T. page 106:
"A And when I told them up there again that I was
her uncle, and I didn't think they had a right to
take her in and question her, and one of the officers, I don't know which one it was spoke up
and says, 'Why she'.s got an attorney in there
to defend her.' He says, 'to give her constitu-

13
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tional rights.' I says: 'Is he her attorney, or
who?' I says, 'I didn't know anything about it
until this time.' "
Segler, T'. page 109 :
Well, I am not sure, but it seems to me like it
was Mr. Benson, it was one of them, like I said
I wasn't acquainted with the men, didn't know
them at the time, but they said she has got an
attorney in there to advise her, and so they
didn't want to let us in, because I said that I
figured she needed her father's presence or an
attorney. And they said 'Why she's got an attorney in there to advise her.' And that is the
only answer we got, in regards to that."
William Hopkins, Direct, T. p. 114:
"A ***and there we contacted Mr. Benson, Sheriff
Miller and Sheriff Bybee, and as I remember it
right, I made the remark that it didn't look to
me like a fair, square deal, to rail:r.oad that girl
into that sheriff's office without counsel or
friends of any description.
***
Q Did you ask for counsel then?
A Yes. I said 'I believe that she should have an
attorney in there.' And I made the remark that
I intended to employ you as an attorney."
Hopkins, ReDirect, T. p. 116:
"A Yes, I told them when I first went in there I
thought that that was wrong for them to take
her in there and quiz her and railroad her."
"A

Wells, Cros:s, T. p. 136:
"Q Now, you said she did ask for counsel. Was
there anyone that spoke up and said you can
get him, we will go get him for you now?
A I think in answering thatQ Just answer that
A She did ask for counsel
Q And she didn't get counsel
A Not at that time, no, sir.
Q Did she ever tell you, 'I .don't want counsel?'
A No, that statement was never made to me."
14
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Defendant's oral confession was not voluntary and the
following excerpts from the record show that it wasn't and
that induceme~nts were made:
Nelson, Direct, T. p. 73 :
"Well, I said to Mrs. Ashdown again, that the doctor
still claimed that Ray had been poisoned and we
would like to find out what had happened and asked
her if there was any chance she had made a mistake
of any kind and put poison in that lemon juice and
thought it was salt.**"
Nelson, Direct T. p. 76:
"A Well, then I asked Mrs. Ashdown again, I says,
'Now,' I says, 'Think and see if there has been
a chance that there has been a mistake made,
any kind of a mistake made' I says 'we should
know about it and we could iron it out.'"
Nelson, Direct, T. p. 77:
***And I think I asked her about the same thing
over again, that somebody must have put some
poison in the cup because Ray was pronounced being
poisoned."
Nelson, Direct T. p. 78 :
***Why don't you tell us the truth about that poison
and how it got in the cup. I says 'Tell us the truth
about it so as w~e can clear this thing up.' She started
crying and said 'I will never see my children any
more.'' And I says, 'Yes, you would see your chilrden
again, Mrs. Ashdown.' I says, 'Your children will be
taken care of.' I says, 'Just tell us who put the
poison in the cup."
Nelson, Cross, T. p. 93:
"Q Then I asked you at the hearing, to impress it
very much, at that time I will ask you did not
Patrick Fenton, the distirct attorney, in your
presence and in the presence of Mr. Welsh, say
'I killed five men while I was in the Army and
it is better to confess, I got off. If I hadn't
done that' and you studied and you studied, and
you said you didn't hear that statement.***You
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know now it was said.
Yes, I know there was something to that effect,
now, yes.
Milda Hopkins Ashdown, Direct T. p. 112:
Milda, will you tell the court when you were being examined by the officers what Pat Fenton
told you in reference to killing those men?
A Well, he said 'if you will tell us what happened,
why it will go a lot easier on you. He says, I
confessed and it was a lot easier on me, If I
hadn't confessed I might not have gotten off.. I
might have been facing the firing squad now.'"
Wells, Direct, T. p. 123:
"Sheriff Nelson asked her if there couldn't have been
some mistake of when this liquid was taken by her
husband. He asked her if she couldn't have made a
mistake by putting something in the liquid besides
salt.
Q Was that subject dwelled on at any great length,
Mr. Wells?
A Yes, sir. That question was asked her, to the
best of my recollection fifteen or twenty times."
Wells, Direct, T. p. 126:
"Mr. Nelson at that time asked Mrs. Ashdown, and I
think the statement was made this way: He says,
"Mrs. Ashdown, you know that Ray did not mix the
poisoning and take it his self."
Wells, Direct, T. p. 127:
"Mr. Fenton made the statement as I recall being in
quite a predicament at one time his self; that he was
accused of killing four men and through the cooperation of the investigating officers and by telling the
truth the investigating officers was of much value
to him and possibly saved him from the firing
squad."
Wells, examinati.on by the Court, T. p. 137:
"Can you tell me how it came about that Mr. Fenton
read those statutes relating to murder or manslaughter and what was said before he came to reading
those statutes:
"Q
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A

At that time, your Honor, I think that she was
asked if a mistake could have been made, at the
time that this lemon juice was mixed, and if
there had been a mistake made, I think Mr. Fenton, as I understood it, described the different
penalties, in case that there would have been a
prosecution."
Q And what did she say:
A As I remember it he read the statutes to her
and told her the difference, that if a prosecution, a complaint was issued against her, of
what the difference of the complaint would be.
Q Was there anything said about it would be better for her to tell what happened at that time?
A I think she was told at that time that if there
had been a mistake made, that in case of prosecution it would be a lesser degree, the crime."
Fenton, examination by the Court, page 144:
"A Yes, your H·onor. Mrs. Ashdown had been asked
by the sheriff several times if there was any
possibility of an accident in connection with
this matter, if she might possibly have got hold
of some poison and put it in the lemon juice
thinking it was salt. And at one point during
the phase of the conversation I told Mrs. Ashdown that at one time in Europe I had been
accused of killing five men and that I had told
the investigating officers of what had happened, and that they had helped and in effect
cleared me of the charges, and that if it was an
accident she might wish to tell the investigating officers what had happened."
Nelson, Direct, T. p. 159:
"I told Mrs. Ashdown, I sars. 'Is there any chance,
possible chance, that there has been a mistake made,
accidently, or any other way? and I says, 'If there
has, I 'vish we knew about it.' 'Well,' I says, 'Someone must kno\v something· about it."
Nelson, Direct, T. p. 160:
***And I says, 'Someone had to--someone had to put
the poison in that lemon juice, it is pronounced
poison.''
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Nelson, Direct, T. p. 161:
***Finally I said to Mrs. Ashdown, I said, 'Mrs. Ashdown, I don't believe that Ray put that poison in that
juice.' I said, 'Why don't you tell us the truth about
that poison and who put it in?' She says 'I'll never
see my children any more.' 'Yes,' I .says 'You'll see
your children again, that will be taken care of."
Wells, Cross, T. p. 173 :
"Mr. Nelson at that time asked Mrs. Ashdown, he
told Mrs. Ashdown that he didn't believe that that
was the truth, that he didn't think that Ray had
mixed the strychnine in the lemon juice; therefore,
he asked Mrs. Ashdown to tell him the truth about
who put the strychnine in the lemon juice.***" · ·
Wells, Cross, T. p. 181:
"Mr. Fenton at that time told Mrs. Ashdown that he
had an experience and was charged at that time with
killing four men, I think, in Europe, and he had cooperated with the investigators who was investigating the case and they were the ones that had helped
to clear him."
Defendant was not properly advised of her Constitutional rights:
There is a little conflict in the record as to just when
or how defendant was advised of her Constitutional rights.
At any rate it was not at the beginning of the questioning
as the record bears out:
Nelson, Direct, T. p. 74:
"Q Sheriff, prior to asking Mrs. Ashdown if she
had made a mistake, was Mrs. Ashdown informed as to whether or not she needed to answer
your questions ?
A I don't believe at that time. I believe it was a
little later on when we advised her of her-when you
advised her of her constitutional rights. I don't believ-e it was right on the start.
A

***

We had talked to her a f,ew minutes befove that,
before you had explained the constitutional
rights.
18
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Will you tell us as nearly as you can remember
the words that were used in explaining Mrs.
Ashdown's rights to her?
A Yes, you told her you wanted to advise her of
her constitutional rights, that she was entitled
to an attorney, that she didn't have to answer
any questions unless she wanted to, the questions that she did answer could be used against
her in court if it came to court. I think that is
about what you told her.***
Q Was anything said to Mrs. Ashdown about she
was free to leave the Courtroom if she cared to?
A By George, I don't remember about that."
Nelson, Cross, T. p. 89:
Q

All right, then you told the court that you started to question her, you don't know just how
long after Mr. Fenton, after you had been questioning her,-you said it was after you had
been questioning her, he advised her of her constitutional rights. Is that right?
A It wasn't long after we started questioning her.
Q Would you say half an hour or an hour?
A I would say around a half hour."
Officers repeated their questions over and over:

"Q

Nelson, Direct, T. p. 76 :
"***I says 'No, we don't want you to confess to anything you didn't do ; we don't want anyone to confess to something they didn't do.' And I think that
was told to her at least twenty-five or thirty times
during the conversation in the evening."
Nelson, Direct, T. p. 77:
"***And I think I asked her about the same thing
over again, that somebody must have put some poison in the cup because Ray was pronounced being
poisoned."
Wells, Direct, T. p. 123:
"Yes, sir, That question was asked her, to the best
of my recollection fiftee·n or twenty times."
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It is a fundamental rule of criminal law that a confession may not be used against a defendant, unless the prosecution can show its free and voluntary character, that it was
made without previous inducement, and that neither duress
nor intimidation caused defendant to furnish such evidence
against himself, and so long as the constitutional privilege of
a defendant not to give evidence against himself exists, that
right must be protected by adherence to the well established
rule intended to guard against undue advantage being taken
of his fears, hopes or mental or physical weakness. See People v. Loper 112 Pac, 720 (Cal.)
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Crank,
105 Utah, 332, 142 ·Pac. 2nd, 178, held that the state has
burden of proving that alleged confession was voluntary by
a preponderance of all the evidence on that question. Our
court in this case reviews American authorities on the question of when a confession is voluntary from which the following is quoted :
From page 189 of the Pacific Report:
In the fol1owing cases the language in each mentioned
was held to be an inducement sufficient to exclude a confession or statement made in consequence thereof: In Kelly
v. State (1882) 72 Ala. 244, saying to the prisoner 'You have
got your foot in it, and somebody else was with you. Now,
if you did break open the door, the best thing you can do is
to tell all about it, and to tell who was with you, and to tell
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.' In
People v. Barrie, 49 Cal, 342, saying to the accused: 'It will
be better for you to make a full disclosure.' In People v.
Thompson ( 1890) 84 Cal, 598, 605, 24 Pac. 384-6, saying to
the accused: 'I don't think the truth will hurt anybody. It
will be better for you to come out and tell all you know about
it, if you feel that way.' ***In Biscoe v. State (1887) 67
Md. 6 8 A 571 saying to the accused : 'It will be better for
you t~ tell th~ truth, and have no more trouble about it.'
***In Com. v. Myers (1894) 160 Mass. 530, 36 N.E. 481,
saying to the accused: 'You had better tell the t1·uth.' ***In
20
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Vaughan v. Com. (1867) 17 Gratt, Va. 566, saying to the
accused: 'You had as well tell all about it.' "
And further quoting from Justice's Larsen's opinion in
State v. Crank, from page 190 of the Pacific Report:
"The New Mexico court distinguishes the two cases by
the statement 'appellant is an intelligent, educated man'
which makes in the Wickman case. In other words, the court
holds that in the case of an uneducated person it will more
easily infer some promise of leniency which would influence
the mind of the accused to confess, than in the case of an
educated man.*** (bold face type added)
The "Vyoming court in Maki v. State, 18 Wyo, 481, 112
P. 334, 335, 33 L.R.A.N.S. 465, was considering whether
testimony given by the accused at an inquest was admissible
as being a voluntary confession, and gave the following definition: 'A statement, to have been voluntarily made, must
proceed frcm the spontaneous suggestion of the party's own
mind, f~ee from the influence of any extraneous, disturbing
cause.' (Bold face type added).
Going on, the court quotes 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, 225:
'The manner of the examination is therefore particularly regarded; and if it appears that the prisoner had not been left
wholly free, and did not consider himself to be so in what
he was called upon to say, or did not feel himself at liberty
to wholly decline any explanation or declaration whatever,
the examination is not held to have been voluntary."
.1\nd from page 191 of the Pacific Report, same case:
"In a case of long protracted questioning of a Chinese,
in the absence of an interpreter, friends or counsel, People
v. Quan Gim G.o\v, 23 Cal App. 507, 138 P. 918, 919. the court
said: 'Vvhile no physical force "'"as used, and neither threats
nor promises made, there can be do doubt at all but that the
repeated questioning of the officers, like the constant dropping of water upon a rock (bold face type added) finally wore
through his mental resolution of silence. Admittedly, his
refusal at first to ans'\\rer incriminating questions gave evidence of a desire to make no statement. When, then, did this
unwillingness vanish and a desire to talk succeed it? Not
after he had been given any period of time for reflection;
for his inquisitors aUowed him none. The examination was
persisted until a response was forthcoming, and, under the
circun1stances, it must be said that the responses appear to
21
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have been unwillingly made and as a direct result of continued importuning.***The fact that the questi.oning was
done by police officers presents an important item for consideration in determining whether the admissions extracted
were of a voluntary character.'***
In State v. Johnson, 95 Utah, 572, 83 P. 2d 1010, 1013,
the court considered the matter of voluntariness, and said:
'In determining whether a confession was voluntary there
must be taken into consideration the age and intelligence of
the witness, the place and conditions under which the statement was made, the circumstances that invoked the conversation, as well as the nature, content and import of the statement itself.' "
Therefore, in view of the record and evidence which
show so clearly that the statements made by the defendant
herein were not free and voluntary but were the result of
duress, intimidation, sustained pressure and inducement by
the officers of Iron County, and that all of such proceedings
were definitely in violation of the constitutional rights of
the defendant, defendant-appellant strongly contends that
the Court erred in finding there was no coercion of defendant, or that she had not been denied any constitutional
rights, and the record and evidence will not support the
Court's findings in these respects.

POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY THE
STATE TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT UNDER
ORAL QUESTIONING PRIOR TO HER ARREST, ORALLY CONFESSED TO THE CRIME CHARGED, FOR. THE
REASON THAT SUCH TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE
WERE OBTAINED THROUGH COERCION, DURESS
AND PROMISES OF IMMUNITY AND IN VIOLATION
OF LAW AND OF THE GUARANTEES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITER STATES AND THE STATE
OF UTAH.
22
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It is a well settled rule of law that a confession will not
be admitted in evidence unless it was voluntarily made. The
Appellant contends that all of the testimony relating to the
oral confession of the defendant was inadmissible owing to
the method in which it was obtained, which, as has been
clearly shown in the preceding argument covered by Point
II, that the statements were not free and voluntary, and that
the method of examination was against the guarantees of
the 5th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
which guarantees that the accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself, and the sanction thereto by
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah,
and in violation of defendant's right to due process as guaranteed by our National and State Constitutions, and that the
admitting of such testimony in evidence was error by the
court. There are numerous authorities on this subject of
which the following are some of the late decisions:
Commonwealth v. Burke, 1951, (Pa) 79A 2d 654
(Murder in the first degree) : Due process was denied to the defendant because after his arrest he was
held by the police incommunicado under a fictitious
name and subjected to coercion and extensive police
questioning until he confessed to the crime. "A conviction in a capital case based upon a confession or
self-incriminating testimony which has been coerced
fr·om the defendant to police .officers constitutes a
denial of due process."
State v. Archer, 1953, (Iowa), 58 N.W. 2d 44, (Murder) Defendant was denied due process when the
trial court allowed into evidence at his trial confessions obtained from him after he was badgered without rest to give the statements in the confessions as
demanded by the officers while they had detained
him illegally. Although the confessions stated that
they were voluntarily made by the defendant, the
facts established that they were the result of improper pressure.
23
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In Watts v. State of Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 69 S. Ct.,
1347, 13.50, the United States Supreme Court said:
"A statement to be voluntary of course need not be
volunteered, but if it is the product of sustained pressure by the police it does not issue f:r:om a free choice.
When a suspect speaks because he is overborne, it is
immaterial whether he has been subjected to a physical or a mental ordeal. Eventual yielding to questioning under such circumstances is plainly the product of the suction process of interrogation and therefore the reverse of voluntary."
In a recent decision in the case of People v. Cahan, 282
P. 2d 905 (Cal.) the following is quoted: (Reading from
page 911 of Justice T·raynor's Opinion)
"Despite the persuasive force of the foregoing arguments, we have concluded as Justice Carter and Justice Schauer have consistently maintained, that evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional guarantees is inadmissible. (Bold face type added).
People v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535, 102 P. 517; People
v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 ·p. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383,
and the cases based thereon are therefore overruled.
We have been compelled to reach that conclusion because other remedies have completely failed to secure
compliance with the constitutional provisions on the
part of police officers with the attendant result that
the courts under the old rule have been constantly
required to participate in, and in effect condone, the
lawless activities of law enforcement officers. When,
as in the present case, the very purpose of an illegal
search and seizure is to get evidence to introduce at
a trial, the success of the lawless venture depends
entirely on the court's lending its aid by allowing the
evidence to be introduced. It is no answer to say
that a distinction should be drawn between the government acting as law enforcer and the gatherer of
evidence and the government acting as j-udge. ***It
is morally incongruous for the state to flout constitutional rights and at the same time demand that its
citizens observe the law. The end that the state
seeks may be a laudable one, but it no more justifies
unlawful acts than a laudable end justified unlawful
action by any member of the public. Moreover, any
24
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process of law that sanctions the imposition of penalties upon an individual through the use of the
fruits of official lawlessness tends to the destruction
of the whole system of restraints on the exercise of
the public force that are inherent in the 'concept of
ordered liberty.' See Allen, The Wolf Case, 45 Ill, L.
Rev. 1, 20. 'Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to
the same rules of conduct that are commands to the
citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperilled if it fails to observe
the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent,
the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To
declare that in the administration of the criminal
law the end justifies the means-to declare that the
government may commit crimes in order to secure
the conviction of a private criminal-would bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.'
Brandeis, J. dissenting in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U. S. 438, 485, 48 S. Ct. 564,575 and cases cited.
If the unconstitutional conduct of the law enforcement officers were more flagrant or more closely connected with the conduct of the trial, it is clear that
the £oregoing principles would compel the reversal of
any conviction based thereon. Thus, no matter how
guilty a defendant might be or how outrageous his
crime, he must not be deprived of a fair trial, and
any action, official or otherwise, that 'vould have
that effect would not be tolerated. Similarly, he may
not be convicted on the basis of evidence obtained
by the use of the rack or screw or other brutal means
no matter how reliable the evidence obtained may be.
Rochin v. People of Cal, supra, 342 U. S. 165, 72 S.
Ct. 205. Today one of the foremost public concerns
is the police state, and recent history has demonstrated all too clearly how short the step is from lawless although efficient enforcement of the law to
the stamping out of human rights (bold face type
added). This peril has been recognized and dealt with
25
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when its challenge has been obvi·ous; Police officers
and prosecuting officials are primarily interested in
convicting criminals. Given the exclusionary rule
and a choice between securing evidenc by legal rather
than illegal means, officers will be impelled to obey
the law themselves since not to do so will jeopardize
their objectives. Moreover, the same considerations
that justify the privilege against self incrimination
are not irrelevent here. As Wigmore points out, that
privilege, just as the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, is primarily for the protection of the innocent. 'The real objection is that
any system of administration which permits the
prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory selfdisclosure as a source of proof must itself morally
suffer thereby. The inclination develops to rely mainly upon such evidence, and to be satisfied with an
incomplete investigation of the other sources. The
exercise of the power to extract answers begets a
forgetfulness of the just limitations of that power.
The simple and peaceful process of questioning
breeds a readiness to resort to bullying and to
physical force and torture. If there is a right to an
answer, there soon seems to be a right to the expected answer,- that is, to a confession of guilt. Thus
the legitimate use grows into the unjust abuse; ultimately, the innocent are jeopardized by the encroachments of a bad system. Such seems to have been the
course .of experience in those legal systems where the
privilege was not recognized.' (8 Wigmore on Evidence 3rd Ed. 2251 p. 309). Similarly, a system that
permits the prosecution to trust habitually to the use
of illegally obtained evidence cannot help but encourage violations of the constitution at the expense of
lawful means of enforcing the law. See, Frankfurter,
J. dissenting in Harris v. United States, supra, 331,
U. S. 145, 172, 67 S. Ct. 1098. On the other hand, if
courts respect the constitutional provisions by refusing to sanction their violation, they will not only
command respect of law abiding citizens for themselves adhering to the law, they will also arouse public opinion as a deterrent to lawless enforcement of
the law by bringing just criticism to bear on law
enforcement officers who allow criminals to escape
by pursuing them in ~awl~ss ways. ***9a.ses undol;lbtedly arise where a violation of the pnVIlege against
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self-incrimination, a coerced confession, the testimony of defendant's spouse, a violati~on of the attorney-client privilege or other privilege is essential to·
the conviction of the criminal, but the choice has
been made that he go unpunished. Arguments
against the wisdom of these rights and privileges,
just as arguments against the wisdom of the prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures,
should be addressed to the question whether they
should exist at all, but arguments against the wisdom of the constitutional provisions may not be invoked to justify a failure to enforce them while they
remain the law of the land."

And from foot note 4, page 909, of the above case:
"The Wolf and Irvine cases would then be brought
into line with the cases holding coerced confessions
inadmissible. (Cases cited). It is now settled that
such confessions are excluded, not because they may
lack evidential trustworthiness ('a coerced confession
is inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even
though statements in it may be independently established as true.' Watts v. State of Indiana, supra, 338,
U. S. 49, 50, 69 S. Ct. 1347, 1348 and cases cited" but
because of the manner in which they are obtained.
(See McC,ormick, Developments in Admissibility of
Confessions, 24 Tex. L. Rev. 239, 245)"***
In view of the fundamental rules of law governing the
admissibility of confessions, and of all the circumstances
respecting the method in which the admissions of the defendant-appellant herein were obtained, it is contended by the
appellant herein that the Court erred grossly in admitting
such evidence over the objection of her counsel.
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN CHARGING
THE JURY AS PER HIS INSTRUCTION NO. 6, BY
WHICH THE JURY WAS CONFUSED AND MISDIRECTED SO AS TO RENDER AN IMPROPER VERDICT
AGAINST DEFENDANT.
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Defendant contends that it was not alone a question for
the Jury to find whether they believed the statements had
or had not been made by defendant during the oral questioning prior to her arrest, but rather whether they believed
such statements, had been made by the defendant and that
such statements were the free and voluntary statements of
defendant and not made under coercion, duress and promises of immunity, and the Court in failing to so instruct
committed error in submitting the same to the Jury.
Under Instruction No. 6, the Jury was instructed that
they could consider the statements made by the defendant
on the two occasions she was interviewed by the officers, in
answer to their questions, and that they could consider the
surrounding circumstances including the events~ of the day
and the experiences of the defendant during the day and on
days immediately preceding, the attitude and conduct of the
officers mentioned, their statements to the defendant, and
whether any threats were made or any promises, either express or implied, of immunity for prosecution, or whether
any assurance was given of any benefit or reward to the defendant if she made a statement. They were also charged
to consider the length of time covered by the questioning
and whether the circumstances show any coercion or compulsion or any physical or mental strain or suffering or fear
or hysteria on the part of the defendant during the time.
Then the Court says, quoting from said Instruction No. 6:
"After giving due consideration to all the surrounding circumstances, you should determine whether the alleged statements were made by the defendant, and if so, whether such
statements or any of them are entitled to be believed and if
so to what extent. You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of such statements and the weight to be given to them
if you believe that any such statements were made."
28
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This Instruction fails to advise the Jury that if they
should find that the alleged statements were not freely and
voluntariy made, that they (the Jury) should disregard
them.
Our Utah Supreme Court has passed upon this question
in the case of State v. Crank, 105 Utah, 332, 142 Pac. 2nd,
178. From page 185 of the Pacific Report, I quote Justice
Larson:
"The law relative to just what part the jury may
play in determining whether a confession was voluntary is in an unhappy state of flux. There is no uniformity in the decision. Roughly speaking they may
be placed in three classes. Some hold that the question is soley one of law for the Court. ***The second
group of jurisdictions have decisions which seem to
hold that the question of voluntariness of a confession should be submitted to the jury for a .determination of whether it was sufficiently voluntary for
them to consider it as evidence in making their conclusion as to his guilt. In many of these states the
question has not been squarely passed upon, and what
is said in the opinions is largely dicta based upon the
practice in vogue. We shall examine these cases
later. The States which may be placed in this group
are: (various states) and Utah.***
Fl'om page 186 :
We now turn to the cases in the second group. The
practice there is best expressed by the court of California and of Massachusetts. In People v. Black, 73
Cal, App. 13, 238 P. 374, 376, the court said: 'Before
we exhibit the state of the record upon this situation,
it may be well to state the rule \vhich regulates the
respective functions of judge and jury when the
question of the admissibility of a confession arises
in a criminal case. The judge must determine, first,
and as a matter of course, whether the confession
was free and voluntary, and whether, therefore, it is
to be heard by the jury. Notwithstanding, however,
the settlement of this question, which is merely preliminary, and which bears solely upon the matter of
the admissibility of the confession, as already indi-
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cated, there is yet a function to be exercised by the
jury concerning it. In allowing the confession to go
to the jury, the judge has ruled, it is true, that it
was freely and voluntarily made, but the ruling in no
way binds the jury. (bold face type added). That
body, now considering the matter substantively, may
disregard the view of the judge made evident by his
permitting the confession to be heard, and may, as
the trier of all final questions of fact in the case,
conclude that the confession was not free and voluntary, and may therefore refuse to consider it.'
And from page 188:
In deliberating on a verdict the jury considers all the
evidence submitted to it as it bears upon the question to be decided. Conflicts must be reconciled by
the jury, or it (the jury) must decide which it believes. It must also determine what weight it ascribes or gives to the various items of evidence.
Since a defendant cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself either in or out of court-that
is, since the jury can only cons:ider statements of defendant which are his voluntary and free will act,
the jury must of necessity, as to any statements attributed to him, determine if they were free and voluntary, for testimony otherwise obtained from accused is entitled to no credence in law. When there
is a conflict in the evidence as· to how a confession
was given, the court advises the jury that evidence
of the accused, involuntarily given, is as a matter of
law entitled to no credence. (bold face type added) Or
as generally put in the decisi·ons, the court instructs
the jury that if any confessing statements attributed
to accused were not his free and voluntary utterances
they should disregard them, which is simply the
same as saying as a matter of law it is entitled to no
weight or credence. This is the real substance of
nearly all the decisions which say that the jury ultimately determines the question of the voluntariness
of the confession. It is closely akin to the standard
stock instruction that if the jury believe that a witness has knowingly testified falsely on any material
matter they may disbelieve all hi~ testimony. Thus
the voluntariness of the confession as a matter of
law is solely for the determination of the court; that
is to say, the court is the sole judge of the question
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as to whether the confession was obtained in a way
the law does not sanction ; whether things were done
to obtain a confession which render it incompetent
as not the result .of a free and untrammelled will, as
a matter of law. Was it obtained in such a way that
the law suppresses it as the result of taking unfair,
an unconstitutional advantage of the accused? That
is the problem of the court. It may well be that although it was not obtained under such conditions
that the law '\\7ill suppress it, yet it may have been
obtained under such conditions that as a substantive
matter the accused may have been led, caused or induced to make statements or admit facts against
himself, not the result of his own will or choice but
by the suggestions, veiled implications, or conduct of
others in a position of apparent advantage. Did it
emanate from the desire of the accused to tell the
truth or from other motives induced by the actions,
words, or circumstances created by others who are
in an apparent position of advantage to help or hinder? If the jury thinks it so obtained they may give
it no credence or weight whatever. See Greenleaf,
16th Ed. Vol. 1_ pp 355, 356; Wigmore, 3rd Ed., Vol.
III, pp 349, 350 and cases cited. This becomes a
question of fact for the jury, and they may be told
to disergard it as unworthy of belief if they find it
was so obtained. There is then no conflict between
the function of the court and jury."
Appellant contends that in the instant case none of the
testimony as to her admissions should have been admitted
and that the Court erred in finding that such statements
were v:oluntary, and agrees with what Justice Wade said in
his concurring opinion in State v. Crank that the important
thing is that the judge be convinced that the confession is
voluntary before he gives it to the jury; that he holds· the
trump card and once given to the jury if it was in reality
not voluntaril~r given, much harm may be done.
But after the Court did admit such testimony in evidence it was his duty to have instructed the jury that if
the Jur~~ f.ound these statements were not free and voluntary
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utterances of defendant, that they should disregard them.
But instruction No. 6 failed in this regard and could only
have confused and misdirected the Jury. The Jury didn't
know what to do even if they believed the statements made
by defendant weren't voluntarily made, for the Court had
only instructed them that all they had to find was whether
they belived such statements had been made by defendant
and if they were true. It may have been that the Jury in this
case believed the statements had been involuntarily made,
yet, because of the insufficiency and the confusing nature of
the Instruction, they may have been constrained to reach a
verdict of conviction because they didn't know if they were
not satisfied that such statements were voluntarily made
that they should give no credence to them.

POINT V. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL.
POINT VI. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
Defendant asserts that for all the reasons set forth
above, the lower Court committed error in denying the motion of the defense for a directed verdict made at the conclusion of the trial, and in denying defendant's Motion for
New Trial, and that for the reasons submitted herein the
verdict of the Jury and decision of the trial court should be
reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

J. VERNON ERICKSON,
Attorney for Appellant.
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